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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Plaintiffs, Joel W. and Kathleen F. Harmon (hereinafter the "Harmons") filed a claim 
with their insurance company Defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 
(hereinafter "State Farm") when their motor home was broken into and damaged. State Farm 
offered to settle the claim by payment of a sum insufficient to repair the motor home, and did not 
offer to declare the motor home a total loss and pay the actual cash value. The Harmons brought 
suit against State Farm for breaching their insuring agreement by failing to offer to adequately 
repair the motor home or pay the actual cash value of the motor home. 
B. Proceedings Below 
State Farm moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it had not breached the 
insuring agreement when it offered to pay a fraction of the cost to repair the motor home. The 
District Court agreed and dismissed the Harmons' case. 
C. Facts 
The Harmons own a 2008 National Pacifica Motor Coach valued between $150,000.00 
and $170,000.00. (Supplemental Clerks Record on Appeal- SCRA - 3-3-2016 at 15) In the fall 
of 2013, the Harmons were in the Coeur d'Alene, Idaho area visiting their son and placed the 
motor home in storage. (R.28) On December 19, 2013, while in storage, the motor coach was 
broken into and the dash of the motor home was destroyed. Id. 
The Harmons immediately notified State Farm of the loss, and in January 2014, State 
Farm discovered that the company that made the motor home was out of business. A 
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replacement dash could only be obtained for an estimated $155,000.00. The total repairs 
including parts and labor totaled approximately $184,000.00. (SCRA 3-3-16 at 24-25) 
The insurance contract between State Farm and the Harmons provides that State Farm 
may repair damaged property or declare it a total loss and pay the actual cash value of the 
property. (SCRA 2-16-16 at 97-98) On May 29, 2014, at least four months after State Farm had 
enough information to either adequately repair the coach or declare it a total loss, State Farm 
wrote the Harmons and offered to do neither. In the alternative, State Farm offered to pay the 
cost to repair the coach based on what it would have had to pay for repairs if the manufacturer of 
the dash had not gone out of business. 
Your motorhome is not a total loss because of an obsolete part, or 
because a company goes out of business and parts are no longer 
available, I am obligated to pay for what the part would have cost 
if it was available. In this case the estimate for a replacement dash 
was $2,000.00. (SCRA 3-3-16 at 26-27) 
The Harmons filed suit alleging breach of contract and bad faith on June 17, 2014. 
(R.12) State Farm answered on July 21, 2014. (R.16) On August 12, 2014, Stat~ Farm offered 
to pay the actual cash value of the motor home, but the Harmons did not agree with State Farm' s 
proposed actual cash value. (Aug. R. at Affidavit of Arthur M. Bistline) On August 20, 2014, 
the parties stipulated to stay the District Court proceeding to complete the appraisal process 
required by the insurance contract when the insured and insurer don't agree on the actual cash 




II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Did the District Court commit error when it determined that State Farm had not 
breached the insurance contract because State Farm was not obligated to offer to 
pay the actual cost to repair? 
B. Did the District Court commit error in dismissing the Harmons' bad faith claim 
based on its erroneous conclusion that State Farm had not breached the insuring 
agreement and determining that no reasonable jury could conclude that State Farm 
acted unreasonably? 




A. The District Court erred when it determined State Farm did not breach the 
insurance contract because State Farm was not obligated to offer to pay the actual 
cost to repair the motor home. 
The District Court concluded that State Farm did not breach the contract because State 
Farm had made an offer to repair the motor coach on May 29, 2014, when it offered to pay the 
Harmons $18,491.36. The District Court's conclusion in this regard rests entirely upon the 
premise that the phrase "cost to repair" does not mean the actual cost to repair. This conclusion 
is in error because no reasonable person would think that his or her insurance policy allowed the 
insurance company to pay less than the actual cost of repair. 
The policy at issue provides that Alaska law shall govern disputes regarding its 
interpretation. (R.30) In Alaska the interpretation of an insurance contract is question of law 
reviewed de novo. Devine v. Great Divide Ins. Co., 350 P.3d 782, 786 (Alaska 2015), reh'g 
denied. (July 10, 2015) The policy here is not ambiguous and its interpretation is a question of 
law, Huber v. Lightforce USA, Inc., 159 Idaho 833, 367 P.3d 228, 245 (2016), which would be 
reviewed de novo under Idaho law. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 
100, 90 P.3d 321 , 325 (2004). 
"Insurance contracts are construed using the reasonable expectations doctrine, under 
which the 'objectively reasonable expectations' of an insurance applicant about the terms of the 
insurance contract will be honored 'even though painstaking study of the policy provisions 
would have negated those expectations.' Devine v. Great Divide Ins. Co., 350 P.3d 782, 786 
(Alaska 2015), reh'g denied. (July 10, 2015) When a term is subject to more than one reasonable 
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interpretation, the issue is resolved in favor of the insured. Bering Strait Sch. Dist. v. RLI Ins. 
Co., 873 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Alaska 1994). 
The policy here provides that State Fann may choose three different methods to calculate 
the cost to repair. 
1. We have the right to choose to settle with you or the owner of the covered 
vehicle in one of the following ways: 
a. Pay the cost to repair the covered vehicle minus any applicable 
deductible. 
(1) We have the right to choose to settle with you or the owner 
of the covered vehicle in one of the following ways: 
[ .. ] 
(a) The cost agreed to by both the owner of the covered 
vehicle and us; 
(b) A bid or repair estimate approved by us; or 
( c) A repair estimate that is written based upon or 
adjusted to: 
(i) the prevailing competitive price; 
(ii) the paintless dent repair price that is 
competitive in the market; or 
(iii) a combination of (i) and (ii) above. 
The prevailing competitive price means prices 
charged by a majority of the repair market in the 
area where the covered vehicle is to be repaired as 
determined by a survey made by us. If asked, we 
will Identify some facilities that will perform the 
repairs at the prevailing competitive price. The 
estimate will include parts sufficient to restore 
the covered vehicle to its pre-loss condition. 
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b. Pay the actual cash value of the covered vehicle minus any 
applicable deductible. 
In this case the District Court concluded that State Farm did not breach the insurance 
contract because it made an offer to repair based on a repair estimate State Farm approved -
option (1),b. (R.33) The District Court erred because the language of the policy is clear that to 
act under option (1),b., State Farm must approve a repair estimate. What it approved was not a 
repair estimate because it was not offering to pay the cost to repair the dash. The only way that it 
can be concluded that State Farm did approve a "repair estimate" is to interpret the word "repair" 
to not require the property be restored to its pre-loss condition. This is what any reasonable 
person would determine repair means. 
First, it should be noted State Farm for the first time on summary judgment alleged it was 
relying on subsection l.b. Nothing in the May 29, 2014, correspondence offering to pay the 
Harmons the fantasy repair cost indicated that State Farm was relying on this provision. Second, 
the word "repair" is not defined in the insurance policy, but any reasonable person would 
understand the term to mean to fix what was broken. 
"Policy language is construed in accordance with ordinary and customary usage." 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Falgoust, 160 P.3d 134, 139 (Alaska 2007). In Allstate the Alaska Supreme 
Court referred to Webster's Third International Dictionary ( 1961) for a common definition of a 
word which was not defined. Webster's dictionary defines repairs as "to restore by replacing 
a part or putting together what is tom or broken." Webster's defines "restore" as "to 
return (something) to an earlier or original condition by repairing it, cleaning it, etc." 
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The relevant common meaning of "repair" is ' 'to restore by 
replacing a part or putting together what is tom or broken: Fix, 
Mend <so neatly repaired that he could see no trace of the once 
familiar rents-T.B. Costain> <repair a house> <repair a shoe>." 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1923 (2002). This is 
the ordinary meaning that an average purchaser of insurance would 
give the term. See Campbell v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 166 Wash.2d 
466, 472, 209 P.3d 859 (2009). 
Moeller v. Farmers Ins. Co. 
of Washington, 267 P .3d 998, 
1007 (Wash. 2011). 
In addition, the policy specifically provides that the "estimate" will include parts to 
restore the motor home to its pre-loss condition. State Farm will argue that this requirement only 
applies if State Farm chose option c. This language appears just after option c, but does not 
restrict its application to the "estimate" referred to in option c. Option c has three sublevels 
which describe three means of reaching a repair estimate, but the language requiring the 
"estimate" to include parts to restore to pre-loss condition is not identified as a sublevel of option 
C. 
(b) A bid or repair estimate approved by us; or 
(c) A repair estimate that is written based upon or adjusted to: 
(i) the prevailing competitive price; 
(ii) the paintless dent repair price that is competitive in 
the market; or 
(iii) a combination of (i) and (ii) above. 
The prevailing competitive price means prices charged by a 
majority of the repair market in the area where the covered 
vehicle is to be repaired as determined by a survey made by 
us. If asked, we will identify some facilities that will 
perform the repairs at the prevailing competitive price. The 
estimate will include parts sufficient to restore the 
covered vehicle to its pre-loss condition. ( emphasis 
supplied) 
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This indicates that language is intended to apply to any repair estimate chosen by State 
Farm. Clearly State Farm was under an obligation to either pay the actual cost to repair the 
vehicle or pay its actual cash value, which is what any reasonable insured would think the policy 
would require. 
The District Court's conclusion that State Farm had not breached the policy because it 
made an offer to settle the claim based on a repair estimate State Farm approved is clear error. 
The option that State Farm had was to approve a repair estimate and offer that to the Harmons to 
settle their claim. State Farm did not approve a repair estimate, it approved an estimate that 
would not repair the motor home and that was a clear breach of the insuring agreement. This 
Court should reverse the District Court' s ruling that State Farm did not breach the parties' 
agreement. 
B. The District Court erred in dismissing the Harmons' bad faith claim based on its 
erroneous conclusion that State Farm had not breached the insuring agreement and 
it is up to a iury to determine if State Farm's conduct was reasonable. 
Tue District Court concluded that the Harmons could not maintain a bad faith action 
against State Farm because State Farm had not breached the policy. (R.31) For the reasons set 
forth above, State Farm did breach the policy and it is a question of fact for the jury if State 
Farm's conduct was reasonable. 
The State of Alaska recognizes the tort of first party insurance bad faith. 
The availability of a tort action for breach of the duty of good faith 
and fair dealing will provide needed incentive to insurers to honor 
their implied covenant to their insureds. 
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State Fann Fire & Cas. Co. v. 
Nicholson, 777 P .2d 1152, 
1155-57 (Alaska 1989). 
" '[W]ithout such a cause of action insurers can arbitrarily deny coverage and delay 
payment of a claim with no more penalty than interest on the amount owed.'" Lockwood v. 
Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 323 P.3d 691,697 (Alaska 2014) (internal citations omitted). Whether or 
not conduct is reasonable or unreasonable is a question of fact. Lindsey v. E&E Automotive & 
Tire Service, Inc., 241 P.3d 880, 888 (2010). 
Alaska only has one requirement for the tort of bad faith to be proved - that the insurance 
company acted unreasonably under the circumstances. 
Although we have declined to define the elements of the tort of bad 
faith in an insurance contract, our precedent makes clear that the 
element of breach at least requires the insured to show that the 
insurer's actions were objectively unreasonable under the 
circumstances. Thus, in order to prevail on her bad-faith claim at 
trial, Lockwood will have to show that Geico's delay in payment of 
her claims breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
because it was "made without a reasonable basis." 
Lockwood v. Geico Gen. Ins. 
Co., 323 P.3d 691 , 697-98 
(Alaska 2014). 
The purpose of Alaska's bad faith law is to motivate insurance companies to do the right 
thing. This case is a perfect example of and insurance company attempting to do the wrong 
thing, getting caught and now it should be held accountable. State Fann's conduct was 
completely unreasonable. 
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The insurance agreement here, like most property casualty policies, provides that State 
Farm has the option to pay the actual cash value of damaged property if the cost to repair it will 
exceed the value of the damaged item. State Farm was fust made aware that the cost to repair 
the motor home would exceed the value of the motor home in mid-January 2014. State Farm 
was under a duty at that point to offer to pay either the cost to repair or the actual cash value at 
that point and if it had and the Harmons had disagreed with either number, the appraisal process 
would have handled this entire case. Instead, State Farm did nothing until May 29, 2014, more 
than four months after the loss. 
Making matters worse, State Farm then attempted to settle the Harmons' claim by 
misleading the Harmons into thinking that State Farm did not have to consider the coach a total 
loss because it was beyond repair and the reason it was beyond repair was because the company 
that built it had gone out of business. No part of the policy states such a thing and what State 
Farm did was offer an incorrect legal opinion regarding its obligations under the policy. 
State Farm then offered to settle the claim by paying an amount for repair that did not 
include sums necessary to restore the coach to its pre-loss condition in direct contravention of the 
plain language of the insurance contract. This conduct is abhorrent. The Harmons were smart 
enough to seek legal counsel. A different insured might not and State Farm needs to be taught 
that if their agents try this kind of thing, State Farm will be made to pay. That is the purpose of 
Alaska's bad faith law. 
Even analyzed under Idaho's bad faith jurisprudence, the Harmons state a valid cause of 
action for bad faith. The District Court found that the amount due from State Farm was fairly 
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debatable so no bad faith action could lie. The amount due for repair or actual cash value could 
have been fairly debatable; however, the fact that the policy required State Farm to pay either the 
actual cost to repair or the actual cash value is not debatable whatsoever. 
The District Court's conclusion that the Harmons' bad faith action cannot survive if the 
Harmons can show no breach of the insurance contract is correct. However, the District Court's 
conclusion that State Farm did not breach the contract is in error, therefore, the District Court's 
conclusion that the Harmons' bad faith claim must be dismissed is also in error. The question of 
whether State Farm acted reasonably in light of the language of the policy is a question of fact 
and this Court should reverse the District Court's ruling dismissing the Harmons' bad faith claim. 
C. The Harmons are entitled to attorneys' fees on appeal because prior to suit being 
filed, State Farm was apprised of all the information it needed to pay or deny the 
claim and the Harmons had to bring suit to force State Farm to offer to pay the 
actual cash value of the motor home. 
A party is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal if provided for by statute or by contract. 
Garcia v. Pinkham, 144 Idaho 898,900, 174 P.3d 868,870 (2007). Idaho Code 41-1839 
provides for an award of attorney's fees if the insurance company fails to pay its insured within 
thirty (30) days after proof of loss has been furnished. The policy allows State Farm to require 
the insured to submit a proof of loss on State Farm's form, but State Farm did not require the 
Harmons to submit one. The requisite proof of loss required for an award of fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code 41-1839 is that State Farm have sufficient information, " ... to allow the insurer a 
reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine its liability." Greenough v. Farm Bureau 
Mut. Ins. Co. ofldaho. 142 Idaho 589, 593, 130 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2006). 
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As of late January 2014, State Farm had sufficient information to determine that it had to 
either write a big check for repairs or a big check for actual cash value. State Farm did not make 
an offer of either until after suit had been filed more than five months later after it 
misrepresented the terms of the policy to the Harmons in an effort to avoid its contractual 
obligations. The Harmons are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees on appeal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
State Farm' s conduct in this case is why the tort of first party insurance bad faith exists. 
State Farm was faced with two options to settle the Harmons' claim, both of which involved a 
large sum of money. Instead of timely addressing its contractual duties, State Farm chose to 
attempt to mislead the Harmons and trick them into accepting a fraction of what they were owed. 
This conduct breached the insuring agreement and is bad faith. This Court should reverse the 
District Court's dismissal of the Harmons' case. 
DATED this 2nd day of May, 2016. 
ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/ Appellants 
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